By The Conversation
Forty-three African heads of state attended the 2019 Russia-Africa summit. They had high hopes that Russia would emerge as a new source of investment and trade for the continent. Russian President Vladimir Putin promised to double Russian trade with Africa in five years to US$40 billion.
Since then, Russian trade with the continent has contracted to US$14 billion.
It is lopsided, with Russia exporting seven times as much as it imports from
Africa. Additionally, 70% of this trade is concentrated in just four countries:
Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa.
Russia invests very little in Africa. It accounts for 1% of
the foreign direct investment that goes to the continent. Mauritius is a larger source of foreign direct investment for
Africa. Additionally, Russia’s gross domestic product has shrunk in value
from US$2.3 trillion in 2013 to US$1.8 trillion in 2021.
Despite these diminishing
economic ties, Russia’s influence in Africa has rapidly expanded
since 2019. It has deployed troops to the continent and become the dominant
external partner in a handful of countries. Russian disinformation campaigns in
at least 16 African countries are shaping the information environment on the
continent.
This has largely been achieved
through irregular means. These include propping up isolated, autocratic regimes
through a combination of the deployment of Wagner paramilitary forces,
electoral interference, disinformation and arms-for-resources deals.
Each of these tactics is
destabilising for the host country.
Predictably, half of the two
dozen African countries where Russia has been actively plying its influence are
in conflict. Russia has similarly undermined UN operations in African countries where
Moscow is vying for influence, further compounding instability.
ALSO READ: Ukraine conflict looms over Russia-Africa summit
Despite Russia’s increasingly
aggressive policies on the continent and internationally, roughly the same
number of African heads of state are expected to participate in this
year’s St Petersburg
summit as in 2019.
More significant than any
commercial deals announced are the political and financial benefits Russian and
African elites are expecting to gain.
Having closely followed
Russia’s disruptive interventions in Africa for many years, the main losers
will be ordinary citizens who will pay for these exclusive partnerships –
through higher taxes, greater instability and less freedom.
The Russia-Africa summit has
obvious benefits for Moscow. It conveys a perception of normalcy following
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, an International Criminal Court war crimes arrest
warrant for Putin and the aborted insurrection led by Wagner leader Yevgeny
Prigozhin.
While Russian-African economic
ties are modest, the continent provides Russia with a global stage from which
Moscow can puff up its geostrategic posture. Africa matters more to Russia than
Russia does to Africa.
Given Russia’s track record of
destabilisation on the continent since 2019, it begs the question why African
leaders would even consider attending the St Petersburg summit.
Security has deteriorated in every African country
where Wagner has been deployed, while human rights abuses have surged. Local
communities have been intimidated into leaving their homes where Wagner has
been given mining access, effectively annexing these territories.
Moscow curries favour with
some of these regimes by providing protection from international sanctions for
human rights violations or for violating democratic practices. Unsurprisingly,
the African countries where Russia is most involved have median democracy
scores of 19. The African democracy median is 51 on Freedom
House’s 100-point scale.
The summit is a chance to show
it’s business as usual for Russia. And that Russia is not a pariah, but enjoys
the implicit endorsement of its violations of international law by African
heads of state.
Russia will likely use this
year’s summit to falsely claim that western sanctions are limiting the export
of Russian (and Ukrainian) food and fertiliser to Africa, distracting attention
from Russia’s culpability for triggering the disruption in global grain
supplies.
The summit also highlights the
increasing importance of Africa to Russian foreign policy. Africa remains the
continent most welcoming of Russian engagement. It’s also the least willing to
criticise Moscow for its land grab in Ukraine. Russian foreign minister Sergey
Lavrov has made at least eight visits to Africa since Russia launched its
attack in March 2022.
Anaemic investment,
normalising autocracy, fomenting instability and intervening in African
domestic politics doesn’t sound like a winning strategy for building a long-term
partnership.
It’s one thing to take a
non-aligned posture on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which may seem like a
far-off conflict. But why would African leaders continue to engage with a
foreign actor with an active record of undermining stability on the continent?
A clear-eyed assessment of
national interests isn’t compelling. The instability caused by Russia’s
irregular tactics threatens to spill across borders and is creating crises of
sovereignty on the continent.
The upending of the rule of
law is simultaneously damaging the continent’s budding reputation as a reliable
destination for investment and international partnerships.
Russia’s influence operations
are nearly always aimed at helping incumbent (typically autocratic) regimes
retain power. Opaque mining and arms deals are frequently part of the package.
African leaders benefiting from these tactics welcome Moscow’s overtures.
Other African leaders see
engaging with Russia as a tactic to get more support from the west.
A minority may naively see
their participation as a genuine opportunity to gain more Russian investment or
encourage more constructive Russian engagement. Expected announcements of
mining, energy, grain, transport and digitisation deals at the summit will
provide a justifying fig leaf to all attendees. Even if such plans never
materialise.
The reality is that Russia’s
strategy of elite co-option is widening the gap between African leaders’ and
citizens’ interests. Citizens regularly say they want more democracy, job creation
and upholding of the rule of law. Russian engagements on the continent are
undermining all three.
The “interests’ gap” between
African leaders and citizens points to another takeaway from the summit: most
African political leaders won’t be championing reforms on citizen priorities
for better governance, development and security. Rather, leadership on these
interests will need to come from African civil society, media and independent
judiciaries.
Moscow is sure to use this
year’s gathering in St Petersburg to conjure up the imagery of shared Russian
and African interests. The key question for African citizens to ask is: whose
interests are being served?
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