By Taylor
Luck, AMMAN Jordan
Ethiopia
has long prided itself on its independence – as the one African nation to repel
Western colonizers and foreign interference as others became battlegrounds for
competing powers.
But as Ethiopia prepares to lay
siege to its restive Tigray region, what was once billed as a policing
operation by a newly assertive central government is threatening to become a
regional affair whose outcome will be felt across the Horn of Africa and
beyond.
And, with a new refugee crisis
already brewing, the pressure is on reformist Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to
swiftly wrap up the fighting to prevent already-mobilizing regional and
international actors from using the conflict to further their own agendas.
Ethiopia’s ascendance as a
regional power and the very peace accord that won Mr. Abiy international
acclaim are suddenly at stake. The war is already affecting Ethiopia’s role as
a linchpin for security and stability across the Horn as it pulls
reinforcements from peacekeeping duties in Somalia.
“The duration of this conflict
will have profound implications for Ethiopia and the entire region,” says a
veteran Ethiopian analyst monitoring the conflict.
“If the conflict is decisively
won in a week and the Tigrayan leadership surrenders, Mr. Abiy is strengthened
at home and on the regional stage. But if this war drags on into an insurgency,
it will be very difficult for Abiy Ahmed to contain the spill-over, or who may
intervene.”
Martin Plaut, Horn of Africa
expert at the London-based Institute of Commonwealth Studies, concurs. “Already
the situation was delicate in the Horn: There are plenty of actors willing to
get involved,” he says.
“If the government does not
secure a swift victory,” that would open the door to more outside involvement,
and “Ethiopian nationalism will flare up and send the whole region into unknown
territory.”
“People are already bewildered at
the pace of events,” he says.
Wednesday evening, after a
72-hour grace period for surrender expired, Ethiopian federal troops prepared
to launch what they called a “no mercy” siege of Mekele, capital of the
northern region of Tigray, where the ruling Tigray People’s Liberation
Front (TPLF) has defied the central government’s authority.
Across the Horn of Africa, the
balance of power has shifted in recent years due to revolutions and outside
competition for its resources and strategic waterways.
Three weeks into the conflict in
Tigray, and regional states are threatening to pierce Ethiopia’s
once-impenetrable status.
Neighboring Eritrea has already
provided Ethiopia with logistics and, allegedly, air power, establishing a
northern flank as Ethiopian federal troops sweep from the south.
The Tigrayan leadership alleges
direct involvement by the Eritrean air force and troops – claims that are
difficult to substantiate amid a communications and internet blackout in the
region.
As retribution, the TPLF launched
missiles into the Eritrean capital Asmara last week.
Although officially denied by
both sides, the closely coordinated operation highlights the growing alliance
between Mr. Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, who signed a finalized
peace deal in 2018 ending two decades of cold war. Mr. Abiy was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize as a result.
Yet observers say there are
deeper motivations for Eritrea’s support.
Eritrea has a long-standing feud
with the TPLF, a onetime ally with whom it later fought the bitter and
devastating border wars of 1998-2000.
The TPLF frustrated Mr. Isaias’s
regional ambitions to become kingmaker for the Horn of Africa when the Tigrayan
group led Ethiopia’s government from 1993 to 2018.
Since the border wars, Mr. Isaias
has slowly rebuilt his influence and networks in Djibouti, Somalia, and further
afield.
By settling an old score with the
TPLF and making the Ethiopian government reliant on Eritrea’s service, Mr.
Isaias sees an opportunity to claim what he sees as his rightful mantle as
regional leader.
“They always saw Ethiopia as an
obstacle to their role as head of the Horn of Africa,” says a second Ethiopian
analyst. “Removing the TPLF is removing an obstacle to realizing that
ambition.”
Fighting has set off alarms in
neighboring Sudan to the northwest, itself in the midst of a fragile and
contentious post-revolution political transition.
Fighting has driven more than
40,000 Ethiopian refugees into Sudan, far more than the United Nations’ initial
estimates, with an expected 200,000 to be driven into Sudanese territory within
months, the largest refugee wave to hit the country in decades.
Due to intense fighting in the
border regions, the U.N. said Tuesday it is transporting refugees some 45 miles
deeper into Sudanese territory.
Sudan remains concerned Tigrayan
fighters may retreat to its porous border region to regroup, resupply, and
stage an insurgency campaign against the Ethiopian government.
Such a development could lead to
a flow of illicit arms and militant activity into Sudan at a time its own
security establishment is under strain and distrust is rife among Sudan’s
military and civilian factions.
Due to a need for increased
manpower, Ethiopia last week withdrew 3,000 troops from its 10,000-strong
peacekeeping force in Somalia.
The Ethiopian contingent is the
largest in the troubled state and has been critical in supporting the Somali
government and bolstering the campaign against the Islamist militant group
Al-Shabab.
With the African Union coalition
already fragile, and partners unwilling to carry the brunt of the burdens
carried by Addis Ababa, there are concerns the African peacekeeping initiative
could collapse should further Ethiopian troops be withdrawn.
“The immediate regional effect of
Ethiopia withdrawing troops out of Somalia is it puts the campaign against
al-Shabab at risk,” Mr. Plaut warns.
Closely taking stock is Egypt,
which has been blindsided by Ethiopia’s meteoric reemergence as a regional
power and direct rival to Cairo’s hegemony.
Egypt is primarily concerned with
Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a project to dam the Blue Nile
River to generate electricity to fuel Ethiopia’s rapid modernization.
Egypt is concerned that the dam
will affect its water supplies and agricultural lands in the Nile Valley
downstream, but has until recently found itself in a weak bargaining position
as talks over the dam with Ethiopia and Sudan have stalled.
With the Ethiopian conflict, Cairo
has become emboldened – some insiders say “euphoric” – and is looking to seize
the opportunity to bolster its position.
The Egyptian and Eritrean foreign
ministers met in Cairo last week to discuss “the current situation in the Horn
of Africa,” and this week Egypt and Sudan held joint maneuvers on Sudanese
soil, the first such military cooperation in decades.
Hovering above the fray with a
watchful eye is the United Arab Emirates, which has extensive economic and
military interests across the Horn.
In recent years the wealthy Gulf
Arab state has invested political capital and billions of dollars to establish
bases, ports, and patrons along the Red Sea coast in Eritrea, Djibouti, and
Sudan, and does not wish to see its interests and control of shipping lanes
jeopardized.
Prior to the conflict, Abu Dhabi
was eager to bring Ethiopia into its sphere of influence and cement its hold on
East Africa, a push fueled by the recent expansion of its rivals Turkey and
Qatar into Sudan and Somalia.
Also alarming is the war’s
proximity to Eritrea, a close ally and where the UAE has a military base in
Assab, from which the Emiratis have projected their military power into Yemen
and North Africa, particularly Libya.
Yet after weeks signaling it was
supportive of Mr. Abiy’s offensive, this week the UAE called for a cessation of
hostilities and a return to dialogue, offering to mediate between the TPLF and
Addis Ababa.
The UAE also became the first
nation to provide aid to refugees fleeing the conflict, donating $4.5 million for
U.N. food relief for Ethiopians on the Sudanese border.
“The Emiratis want to play it
both ways,” says an Ethiopian analyst knowledgeable of UAE involvement in the
country. “On the one hand there are reports of the use of drones from their
base, but they also want to emerge as mediators. Whether the conflict ends
decisively in Mekele or stretches on, this will enhance their role in the Horn
of Africa.”Bottom of Form
Mr. Abiy has thus far rebuffed
attempts of mediation by the UAE, Sudan, South Africa, and the African Union,
expressing confidence that the siege of Mekele will be swift, the TPLF
leadership will capitulate, and order will be restored.
Amid reports that TPLF forces are
retreating to mountainous hinterlands, regional actors are preparing in case he
is wrong.
