By Sishuwa
SishuwaPresident-elect Hichilema on the campaign trail ahead of elections in Zambia.
Zambia has done it again. On 17 August, President Edgar
Lungu conceded defeat and congratulated Hakainde Hichilema on a
remarkable victory.
In the
election five days earlier, the long-time opposition leader had won in a
landslide, defeating the incumbent along with 14 other candidates. For the
third time in the country’s history, power changed hands via the ballot box –
not just democratically but peacefully.
Along
with Malawi, Zambia is now leading the way as one of a very small
number of countries to move away from authoritarianism during the coronavirus
pandemic.
In
addition to the fact that it happened as democracy is generally receding
worldwide, Zambia’s achievement is particularly striking for two reasons.
First, it came after a period of growing repression that had weakened key democratic institutions and led to fears the country could become the “new Zimbabwe”.
Second,
despite President Lungu enjoying so many advantages of incumbency that the
opposition was effectively competing with one hand tied behind its back,
Hichilema won comprehensively.
While
several commentators were predicting a second-round run-off would be needed,
the opposition figure garnered 2.8 million votes, or 59% of the valid votes
cast. That was 1 million votes more than Lungu in a country with just 7 million
registered voters, or a winning margin of over 20 points.
After
every opposition victory in Africa, there is a wave of optimistic media
coverage wondering whether further transfers of power are about to be unleashed
across the continent.
With the
2021 Zambian elections, this has been heightened by the emphatic nature of
Lungu’s defeat.
However,
while there have been moments when events in one country have inspired those in
another – such as the impact of the freeing of Nelson Mandela on pro-democracy
movements across Africa in 1990 – there is a tendency to exaggerate the spill
over effects of a democratic process in one country.Zambia police brutality
Nothing
that happened in Zambia shifts the political reality in Cameroon, Uganda, or
Zimbabwe. Hichilema’s success can only be repeated if the conditions that gave
rise to it are also replicated.
Put
another way, Zambia’s democratic success story will only inspire change
elsewhere if the political context and the strategies used by opposition
parties and civil society groups are reproduced.
That will
be extremely difficult in more authoritarian states with less experience of the
will of the people determining who holds power – and in some countries it will
be all but impossible in the near future.
This
caveat notwithstanding, the lessons of the Zambian election about how
entrenched authoritarians can be removed from power are worth learning – for
opposition parties, civil society groups and all those who care about
democracy.
The most
obvious lesson from Zambia is that economic crisis can undermine the hold on
power of genuinely repressive regimes. This might seem obvious, but the focus
on ethnic, regional, or racial voting in Africa has often obscured the extent
to which people vote on the economy.
Swing voters are more likely to line up behind the opposition, and ruling party supporters are most likely to stay at home, when they blame the government for economic pain.
Ahead of
the election, nearly all of Zambia’s key economic indicators were extremely
poor. Unemployment was high and particularly acute among the youth, one of the
groups that helped swing the outcome in Hichilema’s favour.
Corruption
was endemic, inflation was in the double digits, and the high cost of living left about 40% of Zambians unable to eat as
normal.
The
staggering external debt – $12 billion, up from $1.9 billion in 2011 – took
money away from social services, while service delivery was so poor that
sporadic protests flared up in urban centres.
Exploiting
this favourable economic context, Hichilema positioned himself as the business
savvy leader that Zambia needed, giving people hope that the country can
overcome the recent debt default and put money back into people’s pockets.
Against
this backdrop, Lungu’s efforts to buy support by channeling money through
“empowerment schemes” proved to be ineffective. As in the famous opposition
victories of 1991 and 2011, Zambians took money and gifts from whoever offered
them, but voted with their hearts and their brains.
These
elections were Hichilema’s sixth attempt at winning the presidency and,
crucially, he had learned at least three key lessons from previous defeats.
First, the opposition was more coherent this time, after Hichilema persuaded
eight opposition parties to back his United Party for National Development
(UPND) ahead of the election. Although the allying parties were small and
lacked clear power bases, they were led by well-known figures, including some who had served as ministers under
Lungu.
Importantly,
these individuals were united in their opposition to the governing Patriotic
Front (PF) and seen as credible by many voters. This elite pact legitimised
Hichilema as an inclusive national leader and presented the UPND as the most
viable vehicle for removing the PF from power.
Second,
Hichilema made a real effort to expand his support base beyond his traditional
constituencies in the Western, Southern and North-western provinces.
He
targeted the urban areas of Lusaka and the Copperbelt, where he focused on
unemployment and rallied youths on social media, speaking in their language and
using the popular moniker “Bally”.
He also
appointed Mutale Nalumango, an experienced politician from the Bemba-speaking
Muchinga and Northern province – ruling party bases – to be his running mate.
While the
opposition was becoming broader, the PF was beset by factionalism, driven by
dissatisfaction with Lungu’s decision to run for a third term and his deeply
unpopular choice of running mate, Nkandu Luo.
Third, the
UPND protected the vote. Unlike in 2016, when UPND election monitors had a
limited presence in key areas, the opposition appears to have deployed agents
in almost all the 12,152 polling stations in 2021.
This made
it very difficult for the government to manipulate the vote.
Once the
counting was done and the votes were tallied at constituency level, party
agents faxed the signed results forms to their representatives at the national
totalling centre in Lusaka to make sure their figures matched those announced
by the electoral commission.
An early
intervention by UPND representatives during the official announcement of
results to stop the release of disputed figures for the Feira constituency laid
down an important precedent and shut down the opportunity for electoral fraud.
Civil
society groups in Africa have often been criticised for being too aggressive on
the one hand or too pliant on the other. They are regarded as too elitist by
some, or too reflective of the divisions in society by others.
Similarly,
international funding for civil society has often been branded a waste of
resources by those who lament “Dead Aid”. Zambia, however, shows just how
important civil society groups can be, and why it is essential to support them
through hard times.
In 2021,
they played several critical roles. First, civic organisations campaigned
throughout the country to raise awareness on the importance of voting and vote
protection.
Institutions
like Alliance for Community Action (ACA), Governance, Elections, Advocacy,
Research Services (GEARS) and People’s Action for Accountability and Good
Governance in Zambia held a series of meetings on voter education, sensitising
the population.
Civil
society organisations also carefully monitored all 156 constituencies on voting
day. While GEARS deployed about 10,000 observers, the Christian Churches
Monitoring Group (CCMG), which also deployed 1, 600 monitors, conducted a
parallel vote tabulation that captured the election results at polling station
level, ensuring that any manipulation would be exposed.
Finally,
civil society initiated several court cases against the abuse of state power.
The
persistent attack on the erosion of the rule of law and human rights raised
awareness among voters and helped delegitimize the governing party. Though they
did not always win, the cases drew attention to the erosion of democracy.
There were
also some important victories, not least by legal advocacy group Chapter One
Foundation, which successfully obtained a court order that stayed the
government’s shutdown of social media platforms on election day.
These
lessons can be learned by opposition parties and democracy activists across the
continent.
But they
will not always be easy to reproduce. While Hichilema’s win was celebrated by
other opposition leaders such as Zimbabwe’s Nelson Chamisa and Uganda’s Bobi
Wine, the conditions that made it possible are not present in their respective
countries.
Although
Lungu’s regime was repressive, and there were fears that the army would be used
to repress opposition protests, the military remained politically neutral.
And while
many Ugandans and Zimbabweans demand change, there is no popular memory of
replacing the government via the ballot box to give voters confidence that
their votes matter, and to empower the electoral commission to believe it is
safe to announce an opposition victory.
The
lessons of Zambia are still pertinent in these countries, but it will take many
years of struggle to put them into practice. – Africa Argument
No comments:
Post a Comment