TEL AVIV, Israel
Israel's military has
published its first official account of the mistakes that led to its failures
during Hamas's 7 October 2023 attack, which triggered the Gaza war.About 1,200 people were killed when Hamas attacked Israeli communities, military bases and a music festival on 7 October 2023
The report concludes that the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) "failed in its mission to protect Israeli
civilians".
The 19-page report contains
much that is already known about what led to catastrophic loss of about 1,200
lives when approximately 5,000 gunmen from Hamas and other Palestinian groups
stormed into Israel, also taking 251 hostages in the process.
There are no dramatic
revelations, but it is still sobering to see the military's conclusions about
how it misjudged Hamas's intentions and underestimated its capabilities laid
out in black and white.
The report says the military
regarded Gaza as a secondary security threat, with priority given to Iran and
Hezbollah. Its policy towards Gaza, it says, was "paradoxical: Hamas was
illegitimate, yet there was no effort to develop an alternative".
The military had chosen a
"conflict management" approach to dealing with Gaza, it says. And had
assumed that Hamas was "neither interested [in] nor preparing for a
large-scale war" - a perception reinforced by Hamas's own deception tactics.
Evidence from 2018 onwards
suggesting that Hamas - which is proscribed as a terrorist group by Israel, the
US, UK and other countries - was indeed developing an ambitious plan was
interpreted as "unrealistic or unfeasible", reflecting "Hamas's
long-term aspirations rather than an actionable threat".
The report says that in the
months leading up to the war, the Military Intelligence Directorate began to
develop a new assessment, suggesting that Hamas's plan was not merely a vision
but "a concrete framework for operational planning".
However, this emerging
assessment was not brought to the attention of senior officials in military
intelligence.
The report identifies a broad
streak of complacency within the military about Hamas's intentions and how to
deal with the threat it posed.
"There was no deep
discussion of the question: What if we are wrong?" the report says.
Over time, "a significant
and continuous gap between the intelligence assessments of Hamas and
reality" had developed.
The report also highlights
what it says was "a decline in deep familiarity with the enemy's different
worldview, including its culture, religion, language and history".
It calls for deep reform of
the intelligence directorate's culture, "fostering intellectual openness,
scepticism, listening, learning, debate, and constructive disagreement".
It says the desire to protect
highly valuable intelligence sources contributed to the military's failure to
raise the alert level immediately before 7 October.
The Gaza Division, it says,
"was effectively defeated for several hours" on 7 October,
significantly impairing its ability to understand what was going on and respond
effectively.
It says the Air Force
responded quickly, but that "there was significant difficulty
distinguishing between IDF troops, civilians and terrorists".
The report also says that in
some incidents, wounded soldiers were evacuated before civilians.The report says about 5,000 gunmen from Hamas and other Palestinian groups from Gaza attacked in three waves
After presenting the findings
to commanders on Monday, the IDF's outgoing chief of staff, Lt Gen Herzi
Halevi, said he took full responsibility for the failures.
"I embrace my
responsibility. It is mine. I was the commander of the army on 7 October and I
have my responsibility and I have all of your responsibility. I see that as
mine too. And I see that in every command of mine that went wrong, there is
also a part of me," he said in a video.
Last month, the general
announced his resignation over the failures and called for a commission of
inquiry to carry out a broader investigation that would help prevent another
attack.
Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, who has not acknowledged any responsibility for what
happened on 7 October, has said such a state inquiry should wait until the end
of the war.
His critics accuse Mr
Netanyahu of being unwilling to admit any personal fault.
Israel responded to the 7
October attack by launching an air and ground campaign in Gaza, during which at
least 48,365 people have been killed, according to the territory's Hamas-run
health ministry.
No comments:
Post a Comment