By Peter Fabricius
Both the value and the flaw of
the African Union’s (AU) Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns
in Africa by the Year 2020 is the breadth of its vision. In offering practical
steps for realising the AU’s ambitious plan to end conflict – adopted in 2013
as a flagship project of its wider developmental blueprint Agenda 2063 – the
Master Roadmap identifies just about all of Africa’s familiar ills as causes of
its endemic violence.
Inequality,
poverty, undemocratic behaviour, gross violations of human rights,
proliferation of illegal arms, fragility of states, government corruption,
illicit financial flows from the continent, uncontrolled exploitation of
natural resources, climate change, lack of implementation by AU member states
of the many treaties and decisions on these and other issues, the United
Nations’ failure to fund more of the AU’s own peacekeeping efforts … etc.
The
self-criticism is often sharp and unsparing, including the observation that one
of the causes of African conflicts is ‘the failure of liberation movements to
transform themselves into dynamic governing political parties able to operate
in pluralistic democratic societies’.
The
roadmap also berates many member states and the AU itself for persistently
ignoring the often glaringly obvious early warning signs of brewing conflict
and violence. These usually come in the form of those same violations of
democracy and human rights.
The
roadmap’s main obstacle is its assumption that conditions for silencing the
guns exist in Africa
The
roadmap is often pertinent and even radical in the solutions it proposes. Not
least it suggests stiffer sanctions against AU members that perpetrate the
undemocratic behaviours that provoke violence. But, as Oxfam’s Désiré Assogbavi
pointed out in 2017 after the roadmap was adopted by the AU, it was always too
generic to be achieved in the three years that remained then.
He
proposed that the AU focus on the worst conflicts, setting benchmarks and time
frames. It should also identify and address the most volatile potential
conflicts. Assogbavi suggested that the AU more formally institutionalise its
mechanisms for tougher sanctions against member states for unconstitutional behaviour.
More than
two years later, these observations are just as pertinent, while the
recommendations remain just as unimplemented. For example, the continuing
tolerance of undemocratic behaviour.
It does
seem something of an anomaly that it was Equatorial Guinea that introduced a
resolution at the UN Security Council in February this year for greater
cooperation between the UN and AU in silencing the guns. This is after all a
very repressive country – one that perpetrates many of the underlying causes of
violence identified in the roadmap.
The AU is
of course only as strong as its member states and since many of them are deeply
undemocratic, they are unlikely to reprimand or sanction others for the same
flaws. But then it must be acknowledged that that is going to be a major
obstacle to silencing the guns.
After
just six years of the whole initiative and barely three of the roadmap, it’s no
surprise that Africa remains far from silencing all or even most of the guns.
Some successes in peace efforts have been registered, such as the
Ethiopia-Eritrea peace accord, the Sudan peace deal, the revitalised South
Sudan peace deal, the mediations in Madagascar and Central African Republic –
although many remain tentative.
However the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the most
comprehensive global monitor of conflicts, shows that despite some fluctuations
either way, the 2018 death toll from organised violence in Africa barely
changed from that of 2013. It was 15 455 in 2013, jumped steeply to 24 264 in
2014, dropped to 20 515 in 2015, dropped again to 17 416 in 2016, rose to 18
308 in 2017, then dropped to 15 003 in 2018.
Now, as the Institute for Security Studies’ Peace
and Security Council Report notes, the AU
has just adopted as its 2020 theme ‘Silencing the guns: creating conducive
conditions for Africa’s development’.
This
seems like a last push to, if not silence, at least lower the decibel levels of
the guns by 31 December 2020. (Even if the key phrase ‘by 2020’ has been
quietly dropped from the title.) This seems to be a tacit acknowledgement of
failure, or perhaps just reality – that the guns will not go quiet next year.
The AU
must enforce its own stated values as a start to nipping future conflicts in
the bud The PSC Report believes the project ‘was ambitious from the outset’ and
that the roadmap was bound to struggle given its tight deadline. It does
conjecture though, that adopting ‘silencing the guns’ as a theme will
‘galvanise stakeholders to take stock of achievements and challenges in
implementing the roadmap.’ Also that the AU Peace and Security Council will
consider these lessons when developing a more robust action plan for achieving
peace – but only beyond 2020.
The report says the roadmap faced operational and
institutional obstacles, mainly stemming from its assumption that conditions for
silencing the guns now existed in Africa.
Instead,
it says, ‘The activities of violent extremists and other insurgent groups in
the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, violence related to political transitions
and the unprecedented level of climate change and natural disaster-induced displacement
all pose a threat to states’ ability to keep their citizens safe.’ Indeed the
Uppsala data shows the Nigeria-Sahel axis has the highest death rates.
Like
Assogbavi, the PSC Report notes member states’ lack of political will to
implement AU decisions as a major source of conflict. It also finds the roadmap
to be unrealistic in its expectations of AU institutions that aren’t yet fully
functional. Equally unrealistic is its proposal that member states and regional
economic communities as well as the AU and its organs themselves fund all the
ambitious recommendations.
But the
report also notes that the AU Peace Fund has secured more funding from member
states than ever before. This raises hopes that it can finance the
implementation of more peace and security activities. Appointing former AU
peace and security commissioner and former Algerian foreign minister Ramtane
Lamamra as AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns in Africa has also
raised hopes.
In the
above-mentioned February UN Security Council debate, African contributors
tended to emphasise what outsiders could and should do to help silence the
guns. For example, the need for more Security Council support for AU
peacekeeping, and noting that the small arms flooding the continent were almost
all manufactured abroad.
True
enough. But the one thing the AU and its member states have in both their power
and their budgets to do, is to enforce the AU’s own stated values of democracy,
human rights, respect for the rule of law and good governance. That would be a
good place to start in order at least to nip future conflicts in the bud.
No comments:
Post a Comment