From Al-Qaeda militant to Syrian statesman

LONDON, England 

In the tumultuous landscape of the Syrian conflict, one figure has remained persistently prominent: Abu Mohammed Al-Golani. Now, with the fall of the Bashar Assad regime after 13 gruelling years of civil war, he has emerged as kingmaker.

As leader of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group long active in Syria’s northwest, Al-Golani has evolved from a shadowy militant figure with a $10 million bounty on his head into a revolutionary nationalist and widely recognized political actor.

Born Ahmad Hussein Al-Shar’a in 1981 in Idlib, Al-Golani’s journey into militancy began during the 2003 Iraq war, where he joined the insurgency against US forces and fell in with networks associated with Al-Qaeda.

By 2011, as Syria was plunged into civil war, Al-Golani returned to his home country to establish Jabhat Al-Nusra as Syria’s Al-Qaeda affiliate, which quickly gained a reputation for its battlefield prowess and hardline tactics.

A pivotal shift occurred in 2016 when Jabhat Al-Nusra broke ties with Al-Qaeda, rebranding first as Jabhat Fatah Al-Sham and later as HTS. This strategic realignment was designed to more closely integrate the group with the local opposition and distance it from its extremist roots.

“The Syrian opposition has a huge image problem,” Nadim Shehadi, an economist and political adviser who has held positions in academia and think tanks in Europe and the US, told Arab News.

“At one stage it had even lost confidence in itself. It has been described as fundamentalist and associated with Al-Qaeda and Daesh on the one hand and its leadership gave the impression of fragmented and corrupt.

“The regime and its supporters and allies were masters of disinformation and were successful in convincing the world that there was no credible alternative and that after it will come chaos. Russian and Iranian sponsored media played an important role.”

Under Al-Golani’s leadership, HTS aimed to present itself not only as a militant organization but as a legitimate governing entity. In Idlib, which remained under HTS control over the course of the conflict, the group established the Syrian Salvation Government.

This governance structure allowed the group to take on civil administrative roles, providing services and infrastructure repairs, while ensuring some level of order in an area scarred by conflict.

Al-Golani’s public appearances and outreach efforts showcase his ambition to redefine HTS as a nationalist force, engaging with local communities and presenting the group as a viable alternative to both the Assad regime and foreign terrorist organizations.

In 2021, Al-Golani conducted interviews with various media outlets, including Western platforms, aiming to shift perceptions of HTS and express a willingness to engage with broader political processes.

This strategy reflected a calculated attempt to distance his group from operating as a purely extremist entity while emphasizing its commitment to local governance and plurality.

“Al-Golani is trying to change his image with a surprisingly efficient social media campaign focusing on HTS itself as much as on his own personality,” said Shehadi.

“We see them forgiving regime soldiers and releasing prisoners. This is far more effective than one promoting him as a leader or a personality. It would be an emulation of the Assads.

“They are specifically countering rumors about the persecution of minorities. It feels like a professionally run strategic communications campaign. Except for the odd slip here and there.”

Experts view these efforts as indicative of Al-Golani’s understanding that governance and political legitimacy can provide stability and potentially foster reconciliation.