By The Conversation
For 30 years, the Democratic Republic of Congo has suffered from communal violence, armed conflict and insecurity. Diverse actors have tried to stop it but conflict has intensified, particularly in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika. Regular armed forces and non-state armed groups have been involved in the violence.
In mid-April 2023, it was
reported that there were 252 local and 14 foreign armed groups in the
eastern Congolese provinces.
The Congolese state’s
inability to guarantee security has created fertile ground for armed groups to
emerge. Aside from violence, they engage in various illicit activities, like
exploiting mineral riches.
Weakened by decades of
kleptocratic rule and armed uprisings, the Congolese state relies on support
from regional and global actors. The United Nations peacekeeping and
stabilisation mission has been in the DRC for more than 20 years. In February
2023, the UN force (Monusco) had 16,316 men and women from 62
countries operating as intervention troops, staff officers and mission experts.
The East African Community (EAC)
completed its deployment of troops in April 2023. No sooner had
they settled down than the DRC asked the Southern African Development Community
to “restore peace and security in eastern DRC”.
More than a decade
of research on identity politics, indigeneity, human rights,
transitional justice and peacebuilding in the region informs my view on its
prospects for peace. This revolving door of military interventions raises
questions about whether domestic and international actors involved genuinely
examine past failures and draw useful lessons from them. Contemporary crises
often re-emerge from unresolved prior crises. This is the case here.
I argue that the DRC is being
short-sighted, driven by populist pressures and political calculations. It’s
making the M23 rebel movement the single convenient target of its
actions, instead of resolving its deeper and broader problems.
Many of the issues that the
DRC government and other regional actors have undertaken to address are well
known and documented. The UN Peacemaker database lists 19 agreements
concluded since the Sirte Agreement of 1999. This preceded negotiation to end
the second Congo war in 2003.
The DRC has committed to
guarantee security for different communities, to resolve identity, citizenship
and land issues, to oversee the return of refugees, and to a demobilisation
process that addresses the concerns of belligerents.
The East African Community
force’s mandate was formulated with this in mind. The force would, in
collaboration with Congolese military and administrative authorities, stabilise
and secure the peace in DRC. The initial deployment of Kenyan,
Burundian, Ugandan and South Sudanese troops was projected to grow to between
6,500 and 12,000 soldiers in eastern DRC.
The idea was to reduce
tensions by enforcing a ceasefire and a withdrawal of armed groups to initial
positions. Local armed groups would be demobilised in an orderly way through a
political process involving talks with Congolese authorities. Finally, foreign
armed groups would be repatriated.
What came to be known as the Nairobi process framed the resolution of the M23
crisis within a broader goal of peace-making. All domestic and regional armed
groups active in eastern DRC would be disarmed and the emphasis was on
dialogue.
Before long, it went wrong. DR
Congo president Felix Tshisekedi bluntly criticised the EAC force and
suggested that it might be asked to leave.
It seems that a comprehensive
peace strategy is not an immediate priority for Congolese authorities. They
have an eye on elections. These are planned for December 2023, and the current
president is seeking a second term. Tshisekedi’s administration has turned the
fight against the M23 and its alleged backers into a tool of popular
mobilisation in support of its policies. Therefore, military and
diplomatic success on this front remains its priority.
Authorities in the DRC have
also announced that UN peacekeepers in the country would be withdrawn
by December 2023.
Congolese authorities have
criticised the East African force and the UN mission for their unwillingness to
fight the M23. The M23 is seen as representing nothing more than a
masked Rwandan (and at times Ugandan) intervention in the DRC,
and as such the biggest threat to Congolese territorial integrity.
The DRC’s counter strategy is
to recognise some local armed groups as resistant patriots (Wazalendo) to be
officially supported in fighting an external aggression. Several public
officials are on record expressing their support for these Mai
Mai-Wazalendo fighters.
None of the triggers of the
DRC’s recurrent crises can be addressed in this atmosphere. It’s impossible to
imagine scenarios where sustainable peace can be achieved without first
addressing land rights, equal citizenship claims and inclusive governance
institutions catering to the needs of the entire Congolese population.
Enforcement of a comprehensive strategy that addresses belligerence and the disarmament of all armed groups through a combined military and political dialogue strategy, as imagined under the Nairobi process, should be the main priority of any peace initiative. Peace between peoples and countries in the region requires a genuine commitment to addressing all local, regional and international dimensions of the crises in eastern DRC.
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